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In the principal case the general holding is in accord with the weight
of authority. The dictum in the case to the effect that had there been
collusion between the insured and the agent, the former could not re-
cover, can be reconciled with the above statute, although the court
makes no mention of it, as the age provision in this case was probably
such a condition as to take the case out of the statute.
CARL R. BULLOCK
SUIT By MORTGAGEE, AFTER FORECLOSURE, ON A POLICY
WITH THE USUAL MORTGAGE CLAUSE
The plaintiff was a mortgagee of real property which was insured
by the mortgagor under a fire insurance policy which contained the New
York standard mortgage clause stating that in case of loss payment was
to be made to the mortgagee as its interest might appear and that this
interest should not be invalidated by any act of foreclosure or other pro-
ceedings or notice of sale relating to the property. The house burned
down and thereafter the plaintiff foreclosed and became the purchaser
of the property under the mortgage. Subsequently, the plaintiff brought
an action against the insurance company. Held. The mortgagee had no
cause of action on the fire insurance policy. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Baldwi~n
County Building & Loan .iss'n., 163 So. 604 (Ala. 1935).
This case was tried on an agreed statement of facts and there was no
showing that the plaintiff either had notice of the loss at the time it
occurred, or at the time of the foreclosure sale. The attitude of the
Alabama Court was that the plaintiff was not injured and that it had
already received, through foreclosure, all that could ordinarily be ex-
pected from the mortgage transaction. However, if the value of the
property in its present depreciated state is not equal to the amount of the
mortgage debt plus the interest due thereon, the plaintiff is bound to
suffer a loss. Such an injury is the very loss against which the defendant
Insurance Company agreed to insure the mortgagee. Perretta v. St.
Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 177 N.Y. Supp. 923, 188 A.D. 998 (1919);
Seccombe v. Glenn Falls Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 611, 188 Pac. 305
(1920). See, also, Couch on Insurance, Vol. 5, P- 4405-
A contract of insurance has been defined as, "A contract whereby,
for an agreed premium, one party undertakes to compensate the other
for loss on a specified subject by specified perils." This is the definition
set forth in State ex rel. Sheets v. Pittsburgh, Cinn., Chicago, and St.
Louis.Ry., 68 Ohio St. 9, 67 N.E. 93 (903); Ohio Farmers Ins. Co.
v. Cochran, 1O4 Ohio St. 427, 135 N.E. 37 (1922); and is substan-
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tially the same as the statutory definition in the California Code Section
2527 which has been extensively copied in the codes of many other states.
Since this is a contractual relationship, the recovery is made on the con-
tractual agreement and the only concern of the court should be: Is the
plaintiff a party who can recover on the contract and is the liability of
the defendant established under the policy?
It is quite generally held that a fire insurance policy which includes
therein the standard mortgage clause creates an independent contract of
insurance for the separate protection and benefit of the mortgagee and
under such a clause the mortgagee may maintain suit in its own name
for the loss. The Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Dubuque Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., i Ohio App. 447 at p. 450, 112 N.E. io8i
(913); The Farmer's Nat'l. Bank v. The Delaware Ins. Co., 83
Ohio St. 309 at pp. 319 and 326, 94 N.E. 834 (91); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. WVillys Overland, Inc., (D.C. Ohio) 288 Fed. 916 (1922);
Gattavara v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 166 Wash. 691, 89 Pac. 2nd.
241 (1933). See also Vance on Insurance (2nd ed.) p. 658. There-
fore it follows that the plaintiff, when it was mortgagee, could have re-
covered for the loss. Does it lose this position of vantage through the
subsequent change of position from that of mortgagee to that of owner
where the loss occurred after the purchase on foreclosure?
Whether or not a cause of action arose in favor of the plaintiff de-
pends upon its relationship with the defendant insurance company at
the time of loss, at which time the plaintiff was the mortgagee described
in the insurance policy and as such entitled to recover according to its
interest under the insurance contract. The liability of the insurance
company becomes a present one when, by its provisions, the policy be-
comes payable, namely, at the time of the loss. Aetna Ins. Co. v. The
Stambough Thompson Co., 76 Ohio St. 138, 87 N.E. 173 (1907);
Gattaztara v. General Ins. Co. of America, I66 Wash. 691, 89 Pac.
2nd. 241 (1932). See also Ohio General Code, Section 9361. There
is considerable authority holding that the mortgagee under a similar
insurance clause who purchases at the foreclosure sale may recover on
the policy as mortgagee for a loss which occurs after foreclosure but
before the termination of the period of redemption. These cases hold
that the interest of the mortgagee continues until the delivery of the
deed. His; interest is not merged or destroyed at the time of the loss,
and damage before he acquired title is a direct damage to his interest as
mortgagee, since it reduces the value of the property which, in case of
non-payment, he may take in satisfaction of the mortgage debt. Beverly
Heights et al. v. The Continental Ins. Co., 92 N.E. 51, 1oI Am. Dec.
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500 (1883); M. D. Reynolds v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co.,
129 Cal. I6, 6o Pac. 467 (19oo). These cases stress the time at which
the loss occurred as establishing the right of the insured and the liability
of the insurer. The plaintiff in the present case is in an even more
favorable position. The loss occurred at a time when there was no
question about the plaintiff's status as a mortgagee and his interest as
such was injured. Therefore, the plaintiff's right and the defendant's
liability are established and any subsequent change of position between
the plaintiff and the mortgagor, who is not here concerned, should not
release the defendant from liability, nor preclude the plaintiff from suing
on his cause of action.
The Alabama Court, in holding as it did above, is consistent with
the majority of the Alabama cases which have any bearing on the pres-
ent question. But in attempting to be consistent and to keep the plain-
tiff from recovering after foreclosure the court has lost sight of the real
issue of the case, namely, that the liability of the insurer became fixed
at a time when the insured could claim under the policy. Since the
mortgagee may recover only its interest in the policy as such interest
may appear, namely, to the extent of the deficiency judgment, the in-
surance company would lose nothing by the court's permitting this action.
EVA MAE PARKER
INTERPLEADER
LIMITATIONS ON *STATUTORY INTERPLEADER
The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover a real estate commission
based on a written contract. The defendant without answering moved
for an order of interpleader under section I1265 Ohio G.C. The
defendant alleges in his affidavit that a third party claims the commis-
sion for the same sale. The latter's claim is on an implied contract.
The interpleader was denied because the contracts were not of the
same nature and there might be liability on the part of the defendant
to each of the claimants. The William V. Ebersole Co. v. Julius Payton,
31 O.N.P. (N.S.) 190 (933).
Section i 1265 of the Ohio General Code provides: "Upon affidavit
of a defendant before answer, in an action upon contract, or for the
recovery of personal property, that a third party, without collusion with
him, has or makes a claim to the subject of the action, and that he is
ready to pay or dispose of it, as the court directs, . . . shall be allowed
to become defendant in the action, in lieu of the original defendant, who
